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Abstract 
  
This paper examines the relationship between Track I Diplomacy and Civil 
Society in Cyprus. Cyprus has been a divided island for over 45 years despite 
numerous attempts at reconciliation on the societal level and ongoing negotiations on 
the diplomatic level.  It was the aim of this study to examine the ways in which both 
civil societies and their leaders do or have worked together, if at all, to negotiate a 
political solution or reconciliation between the two communities.  Interviews were 
conducted on both sides of the cultural divide and within both political and civil 
society sectors.  Those interviews were coded, categorized, and then thematically 
analyzed. Findings explicate three themes that challenge the relationship and 
cooperation between Track I and Track II; Structural Elements, Nationalism, and 
International Support. Furthermore, it is proposed that the leaders must lead and 
support their citizens in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts while continuing to 
negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem as civil society organizations continue to 
support negotiation efforts.  
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CHAPTER I: THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 
 The Cyprus conflict is one of several long-standing conflicts in the world. Many 
third party actors have been involved in various peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts 
on both civil society and diplomatic levels.  At the civil society level, citizens from both 
communities have engaged in dialogue workshops and other bi-communal 
peacebuilding events since the 1990s. Until 2008, negotiations at the diplomatic level, 
from both Greek and Turkish speaking communities were not fast-paced. However, the 
connection between civil society efforts and diplomacy in Cyprus during periods of 
negotiation has yet to be fully examined within the reconciliation process of this divided 
society. Exploring this dynamic provides insight into the possibility for reconciliation 
and peacebuilding.  
The aim of this study is to find out whether or not there is a connection between 
the role of civil society and diplomacy and the pace of negotiations and bicommunal 
reconciliation. The question that has guided this research is:  
How do Track I and Track II relate to each other in reconciliation and 
peacebuilding efforts during ongoing negotiations in Cyprus? 
Evidence has been examined and analyzed in an attempt to determine the degree 
of reconciliation practiced by both sectors, and how that has, can, or will, have an effect 
on negotiating a solution.  The idea that civil society organizations (CSOs) have any 
impact on diplomatic decisions in Cyprus is a relatively new concept that has just begun 
to be questioned and researched.   
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Track I and Track II diplomacy, as they will be defined in detail later, are two of 
nine tracks within the multi-track diplomacy system, conceptualized over a decade or 
more by Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996). The first two tracks are of 
particular interest here. Track I comprises political leaders in the diplomatic world 
doing anything from international and domestic decision making to local and global 
peacemaking. Track II diplomacy, particularly well-defined and articulated earlier by 
Joseph Monteville (1987), is made up of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and 
nongovernmental professionals. This track is responsible for citizen engagement in 
peacebuilding and reconciliation work as well as bridging a gap in communication 
between societies, leaders, or institutions. It is important that both tracks be working 
together in a post-conflicted society in order to provide a sustainable space for peace 
(Monteville). In the case of Cyprus, it would be beneficial to know how or if these two 
tracks are in fact working together in a collaborative way. The other seven tracks are; 
Track III Business, Track IV Private Citizens, Track V Education, Track VI Peace 
Activism, Track VII Religion, Track VIII Funding, and Track IX Media and Public 
Opinion.  
It would be helpful to know whether civil society or political leaders have an 
upper hand in directing the course of reconciliation and negotiations.  If investigations 
can indicate which sector has more of an influence on the reconciliation process on both 
societal and diplomatic levels, perhaps that information can inform settlement 
negotiations. The exploration of these questions can be found in what follows, along 
with a survey of the historical background of the conflict, the level of trauma Cypriots 
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have experienced, and the nature of bi-communal peace efforts. After a review of the 
literature, I present the methodology used, my findings from semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Cyprus, a discussion of these results, and recommendations for further 
analysis and action.  
Importance of This Research 
The history and memories of the Cyprus conflict play a role in determining and 
framing its peaceful future and are influenced by diplomatic decisions and involvement 
as well as civil society participation. Diplomacy has fluctuated between embracing and 
thwarting reconciliation between the communities. That inconsistency affects civil 
society peacebuilding initiatives.  In addition, CSOs face multiple challenges that hinder 
any long-term success in peacebuilding. The first question arising from these facts is: 
Does the opinion of the public drive political initiatives or do diplomatic efforts drive 
the public’s perspective on, and promotion of, reconciliation? The second question is: 
Does one or the other determine the course of negotiations and reconciliation efforts? 
My preliminary, abstract, and unpolished question before beginning this research was, 
which comes first, the chicken or the egg – does diplomacy lead the peace process or 
does civil society? 
The roles of diplomacy and civil society in peacebuilding are important because 
both sectors help to inform the environment of reconciliation and negotiations.  Looking 
into the dynamics of the relationship of civil society efforts and diplomacy during 
negotiations lends an insight into what helps shape the context of reconciliation and 
what may bring the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities together.  Gathering 
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perspectives from different sectors of the two communities provides insight into Cypriot 
sentiment. Although the number of informants in this research study may be small in 
comparison to the population, their voices represent valuable opinions and beliefs 
across the island. These voices provide insight into the post-war culture of the island, 
which then reflects the flow of reconciliation and negotiations. The more we know, the 
more we can do. 
History of the Conflict 
 Cyprus is a 2nd world country and had been under foreign rule for centuries until 
achieving its independence on August 16, 1960 from Britain. Located south of Turkey, 
just miles away from Middle Eastern countries like Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and off of 
the Aegean Sea next to the Greek islands, Cyprus has been a hot commodity. The island 
has been under foreign rule for centuries mainly because its strategic location has 
provided a perfect staging port for empires, travelers and traders since ancient times.  
Since its independence from Britain in 1960, intercultural conflict has been the status 
quo, resulting in war, invasion, citizen displacement, trauma, hate for the other and the 
division of the island.  Currently, the island experiences negative peace. While both 
sides are not at war in a violent physical manner, Turkish speaking Cypriots in the north 
and Greek speaking Cypriots in the south have been divided into two communities by a 
physical barrier called the green line or buffer zone, manned by UN personnel. Hatred 
for the “other” still widely exists and a diplomatic solution has never been reached.  
 Reconciliation on a societal level and achieving a settlement agreement on the 
diplomatic level in Cyprus would be beneficial in several ways. First, while it may take 
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several generations, demonization of the other would dissipate and peace would ensue, 
allowing the societies to live as they did before; together.  Secondly, the TRNC would 
cease to exist and those in the North would eventually receive EU benefits. This would 
create an entire economic shift where wealth would be distributed in a more even way 
than it is currently, mainly in the South. Lastly, Cypriots would have the chance to be 
appropriately represented not only locally, but internationally as well. This would mean 
the entirety of Cyprus would have one voice after some time and there would be more 
of a sense of cohesiveness.  
After Great Britain ended the Ottoman Empire rule in 1878, Cyprus eventually 
came under the ruling of the British Crown in 1925 (Wolleh, 2001). The Zurich 
Agreements were the first steps toward independence from Britain in February of 1959. 
Several diplomatic solutions on power sharing were discussed and signed at that time, 
called the London agreements, which consisted of nine documents. Three of those 
documents particularly focused on fundamentals of the structure of the new Republic of 
Cyprus, a Guarantor Agreement between Cyprus, Britain, Greece and Turkey, and a 
“Treaty of Alliance” between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey (Fairfield, 1959).  
Appointed in 1960 were Greek-speaking Cypriot President, Archbishop 
Makarios III, and a Turkish-speaking Cypriot Vice President, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk. 
Fighting broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots December 22, 1963 after 
President Makarios proposed several revisions to the new Constitution that were 
considered a threat to Turkish Cypriots, already a minority in Cyprus (Brands, 1987).  
Violent struggle and bloodshed ensued. Around 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced 
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at this time, forced into enclaves, along with 700 Greek Cypriots who fled their homes 
seeking protection (Gürel & Özersay, 2006). Cypriots called on Greece and Turkey for 
help while Britain, a guarantor power, organized negotiations in January the following 
year in London. The London conference failed as each side preferred to manage the 
situation within Cyprus without external support. Cypriots maintained hatred for one 
another while diplomatic meetings, conferences, letters, and threats of war were sent to 
the Cypriot Administration. Turkey was ready to invade the island to protect Turkish 
Cypriots while Greece was ready to fight back and deliver enosis, the political union of 
Greece to Cyprus.  The UN was eventually asked to intervene March 1964, which 
calmed the situation until June, when another war scare emerged (Brands, 1987, p. 354).  
This scare was also averted, but the Cyprus question was nowhere near a solution. 
Retreating into enclaves, the Turkish-speaking community sought shelter, stopped 
paying taxes, and withdrew from government activity. The Green Line was created to 
divide the two communities; Makarios was seen mainly as a Greek Cypriot President 
while Kutchuk headed the Provisional Turkish Administration until 1973, being 
replaced by Rauf Denktash (King & Ladbury, 1982). The Cyprus situation had become 
an international problem, with the involvement Greece, Turkey, Britain, the United 
States, Russia, and Egypt.  
 President Makarios was overthrown in a coup led by the Greek Military Junta in 
1974 and replaced by Nicos Sampson. Very shortly thereafter the Turkish military 
invaded the island. Both Turkish, Greek, and Cypriot sides either held their prisoners 
for exchange, or killed them without question. Both sides of the divide were guilty of 
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killing innocent citizens in their homes and villages based on their ethnicity. Many 
Cypriots were able to flee to the mountains for protection when they received word of 
the coup and invasion. Some sought protection at the British bases on the island. Many 
villages were destroyed and most Cypriots, Greek and Turkish speaking, lost their 
homes and loved ones.  
Due to the geographical placement of Turkey and Cyprus, Greek-speaking 
Cypriots living in the north fled to the south as Turkish troops landed on the northern tip 
of the island. The United Nations facilitated an agreement between the two sides. Over 
the course of a year, between 1974-1975, UN convoys escorted about 631,778 Cypriots 
to either side of the island (King & Ladbury, 1982). Turkish-speaking Cypriots in the 
south were moved to the north and any Greek-speaking Cypriots that were still in the 
north were escorted to the south. To this day, Turkish Cypriots consider 1963 as 
traumatic while Greek Cypriots the war of 1974 the same. The Turkish army still 
maintains a presence in the northern part of the island with up to 40,000 troops stationed 
there (Liang, 2008).  The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established on 
November 15, 1983 by the Turkish Cypriot Administration but was and is considered 
invalid by the Security Council (UNFICYP, n.d.). The south is a member of the 
European Union, is known as the Republic of Cyprus and claims legitimacy over the 
entire island. 
Cypriot Trauma 
During the months of invasions and displacement in 1974, thousands of Cypriots 
went missing; many lost their lives, and most Cypriots lost their homes and belongings.  
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It is important to note that these homes, and the land on which they sat, for many 
Cypriots, had been in their families for generations. This is important because these are 
the sentiments that help maintain the conflict today.  Resentments and grief that come 
from losing a home and community still exist.  
The months during 1963 when Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves and 
Greek Cypriots were displaced as a result, were traumatic times for both communities. 
Turkish Cypriots consider this experience as agonizing as the Greek Cypriots regard the 
experiences in the war of 1974. The intercommunal killings that happened in both 
events added to the fear, distrust, and hatred for each other. For example, Loizos (1988) 
writes of a Greek Cypriot man called Kajis who was a member of EOKA VITA, an 
underground organization that, with the help of the Greek army, overthrew Makarios. In 
1974, Kajis experienced his fellow villagers and officers being ambushed and shot to 
death. Following this, he apparently lost mental and physical control of himself and 
“burst into a house containing seven Turkish Cypriots, including several women and at 
least one child. He machine-gunned them all to death” (Loizos, 1988, p. 641).  
Although there were no combatants, Kajis explained that he was in a war and only 
afterwards did he notice the child. In his account, he says “What harm had it done, you 
ask? It was Turkish. They’d shot my fellow-villager, they’d shot my captain, so I’d shot 
them” (as quoted in Loizos, 1988, p. 641).  While this account may speak to many 
attributes of war and the atrocities that ensued, it is an important account of traumatic 
incidents that scarred both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This shows how trauma causes 
dehumanization of the group that is blamed and justifies actions, which, under normal 
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circumstances, would have been rejected outright. There are many more stories in this 
vein that illustrate the pain and horror Cypriots experienced before the division of the 
island. The fact that a physical barrier divided the island after these horrendous acts 
indicates unresolved anger and pain that still exists.  However, being physically divided 
from those that have come to be hated does not allow a space for mourning, closure, 
communication, or for the process of reconciliation. The more space there is from a 
contentious situation, the more tension is created because communication is cut off and 
the opportunity to resolve the problem has been taken away. There is a barrier instead of 
a space for reconciliation.  
Cypriots were divided for decades, but April 3, 2008 marked a major step in 
negotiations with the opening of the Ledra crossing, which is discussed in more detail 
below, but is important to note now.  Cypriots were not able to see how the other 
community lived for 34 years, nor were they able to see the faces of those that had since 
been deemed as the “Other” (UN Security Council, 2011).  Opening the checkpoint on 
Ledra Street sparked reactions that revealed the pain that still exists from the events of 
1963 and 1974 within both Turkish and Greek Cypriot lives. Children who had been 
driven from their homes were now adults with their own families. Many crossed the 
checkpoints with their families to face painful memories. Some crossed over to make 
peace with the “other” and within themselves.  Some have never crossed the Ledra 
checkpoint out of fear of the other and because of their traumatic histories.   
Those who were young during the 1963 events and lived through the invasion of 
1974 have experienced over 40 years of pain and growth alike. Their children have 
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experienced it second-hand. They have heard the horror stories from their parents. For 
many, the pain of the war has left its mark and has been passed on in intergenerational 
trauma. This part of civil society has influence over future change and it is important 
that the pain of their parents is not carried on in an unconstructive way, especially 
through diplomatic means such as local policies or by a lack of negotiation. The youth 
of the island are an essential factor to solving this problem. Some may become 
diplomats or perhaps strong voices in the reconciliation process. One can only imagine 
that the stories of their parents are more influential than history books; seeing a parent 
cry or hearing hate in his or her voice due to past experience of the war is stronger than 
international opinion, diplomatic negotiations, or religious influences.  
Bi-Communal Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Successes and Challenges  
In an effort to bring peace to the island before the south of Cyprus entered into 
the European Union (EU), Cypriots were asked to decide by referendum on unifying the 
island in 2004. General Secretary of the United Nations at the time, Kofi Annan, drafted 
the referendum.  The referendum, known as the Annan Plan was officially titled “The 
Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.” It consisted of several power 
sharing agreements and outlined the new state and new Constitution. This plan framed 
agreements for a bi-zonal Federation; the United Cyprus Republic. The Annan Plan 
outlined new property laws and compensation dues, constituency representation, the 
demilitarization of the United Cyprus Republic, single Cypriot citizenship, fundamental 
rights, what the new flag would look like, and other functions of a unified Cyprus 
(Annan, 2004).  
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The resulting vote on the referendum was surprising; Turkish-speaking Cypriots 
voted for the plan at 64.9% and the Greek-speaking Cypriots voted it down by 75.8% 
(Anastasiou, 2009).  This was surprising because a prevailing view had been that 
Turkish-speaking Cypriots would not want to negotiate a settlement of any kind since 
their goal was still partition instead of a bi-zonal Federation.   
Cyprus was still divided when it entered the European Union a month later 
(Anastasiou, 2008).  However, the TRNC is not a part of the EU. This event created 
even more of a division between the communities because the south gained European 
Union benefits while the north still did not enjoy international recognition and was 
economically weaker. Turkish-speaking Cypriots recognized a major power imbalance, 
which then spurred paranoia and further distrust between the two communities. Not 
only did the Greek-speaking Cypriots vote no on the Annan Plan, they now had the 
support of the European Union, which meant funding for infrastructure, economic 
prosperity, modern retail advantages, and a legitimized voice in the international 
community. For the north, this meant that all power, money, and voice went through 
and came from Turkey instead of local Turkish Cypriot leadership.    
With such close ties with Turkey, Turkish-speaking Cypriots began seeing many 
Turkish natives moving to northern Cyprus, making Turkish Cypriots a minority in their 
own country.  This ultimately meant that Cypriots living in the north were reliant upon 
Turkey politically, economically, and militarily.  Due to the benefits of being in the 
European Union, Cypriots in the south were able to act more independently than their 
northern counterparts, politically, economically, militarily, and even when it came to 
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higher education. There are capacity building measures supported by the UN, such as 
the Millennium Development Goals, set to build up infrastructure of northern Cyprus. 
Nevertheless, these differences created more challenges to peacebuilding efforts, and 
continue to inform views of the “Other” across the cultural divide today.  
The most promising steps in diplomatic bi-communal communication were 
initiated on March 21, 2008 when Turkish-speaking Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat 
and Greek-speaking Cypriot President Demetris Christofias agreed to launch full-
fledged negotiations. By the 23rd of March, “the two leaders reaffirmed their 
commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality,” (UN Report 
610, 2009, p. 1) a partnership that would speak with one voice internationally but would 
have both Turkish and Greek speaking Cypriot states, which would have equal status. 
Within four months, the leaders set in place six working groups created to review the 
chapters to be negotiated and seven technical committees that would focus on 
confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing the relationship of the communities 
(UN Report 610, 2009).  Actual negotiations between the leaders and corresponding 
representatives took place in September 2008 through the good offices of the United 
Nations. From May 2009 to December 2009, leaders met 27 times, which lead to the 
complete discussion of all six chapters of the negotiation framework; governance and 
power-sharing, security and guarantees, property, territory, European Union-related 
matters, and economic matters (UN Report 610, 2009, p. 3).  While negotiations were 
fast-paced compared to those in the past, a settlement was never fully negotiated and 
many chapters still remain complicated and unsettled. 
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The property issue is especially intricate and complicated.  Not only are property 
laws in the north unacceptable to the south and always in debate, but the historical 
emotions that come into play carry much weight in the lives of those that were forced 
from their homes during the war. This plays a major part in the reconciliation process 
between civil societies and the negotiation process between leaders because both 
communities experienced emotional and physical loss.  
In 1963, Turkish-speaking Cypriots were forced to flee their homes and live in 
very small enclaves. In 1974, Greek-speaking Cypriots were forced to leave their homes 
in the north and move to the south.  Both communities experienced the loss of homes 
that had perhaps been in their families for generations. Today, many Greek-speaking 
Cypriots live in former Turkish-speaking Cypriot homes and vice-versa. Furthermore, 
property in the north that once belonged to Greek-speaking Cypriots has been bought by 
foreigners seeking vacation homes, or it has been bought and built on by those from 
Turkey.  This makes it harder to “return” property to those who lost it decades earlier. 
However, many Cypriots maintain that property lost during the war is still theirs and 
that they should either receive compensation for their loss or have it returned to them. 
But when checkpoints opened and Cypriots were allowed to cross at will and visit their 
old homes, many vowed never to return due to the harassment they experienced across 
the divide. 
Following a commitment to sit at the negotiation table, Cypriot leaders 
Christofias and Talat agreed to open a checkpoint in old town Nicosia on Ledra Street 
on April 3, 2008 (UN Report 603, 2010).  The buffer zone, or ‘green line,’ as it is also 
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called, stretches from east to west across the island, and is a physical barrier made of 
barbed wire, sandbags, old fencing, and warning signs. The UN and Turkish Cypriot 
military or Greek Cypriot military, on their respective sides and stations, man the green 
line. There is a total of six checkpoints set up along the buffer zone that allows people 
to cross from one side to the other. If a visitor is crossing the checkpoints at Ledra from 
the south into the north, he or she will pass through the buffer zone, where old buildings 
may be seen riddled with bullet holes, foliage growing randomly throughout its 
infrastructure, and collapsing roofs. At a row of plastic-made covered booths a visa is 
completed which comprises a slip of paper containing name, nationality, and ID or 
passport number.  Turkish Cypriot military official stamps the slip and the visitor can 
go through. Upon returning from the north, the visitor stands in an opposite line to have 
the visa paper stamped showing exit. The buffer zone is again traversed until reaching 
the Greek Cypriot checkpoint, whereupon the visa stamp is checked.  At no time do the 
Greek Cypriot police stamp passports or visas, mainly because they refuse to 
acknowledge or legitimize any laws in the north.   
Laws governing the movement of people and goods were relaxed after 2003, but 
opening the Ledra Street crossing signified free movement between communities. This 
also provided an increased emergence of bi-communal communication, more civil 
society organization work, and traffic between communities.  
 In April 2010, Dervish Eroglu replaced Talat in leadership in the TRNC.  
Eroglu is a member of the right-wing National Unity Party (UBP) and is known as a 
hardliner. Although critics feared this would mean an end to negotiations, Eroglu 
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assured the public during his Presidential victory speech that he would not walk away 
from negotiations (Yilmaz, 2010). Between 2008-2010, both leaders met a total of 88 
times (UN Report 603, 2010). However, between March 2011 and October 2011, the 
two leaders had only met 17 times.  The meetings, states UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon, have “been spent in clarifying positions instead of moving towards 
convergences” (UN Report 498, 2011, p. 3) although many discussions have made 
some strides. Both leaders have turned to technical experts, as suggested by the 
Secretary-General, on the issue of property, but have yet to return to formal negotiations 
on the matter. The Secretary-General reports various peacebuilding institutional 
openings in Nicosia in his Report on Cyprus. These include Cyprus 2015 and 
ENGAGE, which are supported by the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the 
“Home for Cooperation” opened by the Association for Historical Dialogue and 
Research (UN Report 498, 2011).  Cyprus 2015 and ENGAGE are Cypriot CSOs that 
work closely with other CSOs in support of the peace process. The “Home for 
Cooperation” provides a space for bi-communal dialogues, education, and research. In 
his report (2011) the Secretary-General calls on both leaders to “engage civil society in 
the task of reaching a comprehensive settlement” (UN Report 498, 2011, p. 4) and to 
keep civil society efforts towards peace in mind during negotiations, thereby noting the 
importance of civil society’s involvement in peace work across all levels of diplomacy. 
The history of Cyprus is abundant. The past 44 years have been marked in 
continuous conflict, peppered with peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts from both 
communities. The following section explores literature exemplifying aspects of what 
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communities experience throughout its recent history and efforts that have been made to 
rectify cooperation between communities.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Peacebuilding institutions, such as the Home for Cooperation in Nicosia, are a 
good example of Track II diplomacy. The study of the relationship between Track I and 
Track II diplomacy in Cyprus is important in the peacebuilding process because 
collaboration between the two could produce powerful results. In the course of the 
Cyprus conflict, many diplomatic efforts have been made both domestically and 
internationally to enhance different forms of peaceful unity (Anastasiou, 2008). 
Negotiations have begun and have been halted, fast-tracked, and revisited through out 
the years.  There is substantial literature on the Cyprus conflict, focusing on aspects of 
political science or international relations in peace journals (Anastasiou, 2008; 
Gürkaynak, 2007; Michael, 2007; Turk, 2006; Wolleh, 2001). However, there are many 
more areas to explore within the Cyprus conflict. These areas include the socio-dynamic 
of civil society’s willingness to cooperate and work together to make peace with the 
other community, the impact on civil society after having entered into the European 
Union, and the psychological effects of Cypriot nationalism. Beyond these areas are the 
ways in which diplomacy possibly plays a part in civil society’s decision in directing its 
efforts in peacebuilding.  
There are different levels of diplomacy at work in Cyprus. The majority of work 
that is being done is located in the divided capital of Cyprus, Nicosia. This is where the 
bulk of non-governmental and civil society organizations (CSOs) exist. The capital is 
also where both leaders are based.  
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This research focuses on Track I and Track II diplomacy. Other important 
literature explored here is about reconciliation, peacebuilding, and nationalism. The 
following literature review describes core aspects of Tracks of diplomacy as well as 
characteristics of the atmosphere in Cyprus.  
Track I and Track II Diplomacy 
Diamond and McDonald (1996) have defined nine tracks of diplomacy within a 
multi-track system. Track I Diplomacy is “the world of official diplomacy, 
policymaking, and peacebuilding as expressed through formal aspects of the 
governmental process” (p. 4) where diplomats both internationally and domestically 
play a part in creating the political world, as we know it. This may be in the form of 
international treaties, third party interventions, domestic policy making, and any other 
official acts of political affairs. Track I is an example of directly influential politics.    
A number of authors have talked about different Tracks of Diplomacy. Diamond 
and McDonald have the most comprehensive definitions but Track I and Track II are 
the most important in this paper. Track II diplomacy, previously defined by Joseph 
Monteville (1987), refers to interactions between groups in nations that help develop 
strategies in order to help resolve conflict, mainly through nongovernmental 
professional work. According to Esra Gürkaynak (2007), Track II diplomacy is parallel 
to unofficial diplomacy work, referring to an assortment of unofficial forms of conflict 
resolution actions on a non-governmental level.   Track II work relies on a 
transformational worldview where basic human needs set the agenda, where 
collaboration is key and international relations is more than just crisis management 
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(Diamond & McDonald, 1996). Those engaged in Track II work come from various 
backgrounds and fields; some are from the Track I field, some are theoreticians or 
practitioners, some are experienced activists or educators, and many key players have 
higher education degrees. Diamond and McDonald explain that Track II engages in a 
wide range of activities from workshops to dialogue groups and from institution 
building to communication liaisons. This work could stem from non-profit 
organizations and CSOs that focus their work on local peacebuilding or bi-lateral 
relationships between countries or communities on a continuous basis. The idea is to 
bring together members of the community who will be able to communicate, transfer, 
and support creative and sustainable approaches to reconciliation and peacebuilding 
efforts within the general public (USIP, 2003).  
A. Marco Turk (2006) was responsible for training segments of both societies in 
Cyprus on conflict resolution methods from 1997-1999 and in 2003. Track II, according 
to Turk (2006), involves NGOs and ordinary citizens. Turk (2006) also states that “this 
level can be effective as a connector between Tracks I and III,” (p. 222) where Track III 
contains advocates that are community and business-based. This connection helps to 
support peaceful resolution approaches and exercise co-existence across divides without 
relying solely on the political elite (Turk, 2007).  
An essential example of Track I diplomacy in the Cyprus case is the Annan Plan 
from 2004. While the conflict is, as Michael (2007) writes, a linkage of politics 
operating outside the diplomatic tracks but on five levels: local, national, subregional, 
regional and international, they all run into the same direct politicization of key issues. 
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The Annan plan, while negotiated on a Track I level, was turned down on Track II and 
III levels. This could very well be an example of how a relationship between the tracks 
could be developmentally and structurally beneficial. The work being done by Track II, 
especially in the Greek Cypriot community, was not corresponding to the negotiation 
process nor was the “psychology of the political situation it was seeking to remedy” 
(Michael, 2007, p. 590).  Thus, the Annan Plan was not seen, nor was it communicated, 
as a beneficial option for the Greek Cypriot society, which voted it down in majority.   
Reconciliation and Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding work being done by Track II in Cyprus is not fully supported by 
Track I.  This is exemplified by the lack of public acknowledgment from leaders 
surrounding any peacebuilding efforts, such as the opening of peacebuilding 
institutions. The more both tracks involve and support each other in the peacebuilding 
process, the more reconciliation has the space to develop. Reconciliation is a process of 
restoring relationships that have been alienated due to conflict. Just as in interpersonal 
conflicts, reconciliation on a societal level has a history of relationships, perpetrators, 
victims, and beneficiaries (de la Rey, 2000). Bringing the communities together is vital 
in bringing past actions, feelings, traumas, and injustices into the reconciliation process. 
Without acknowledging the past, it is hard, if not impossible, to move forward. 
Conflicts that last for a long time or that is still in existence do a lot of damage to 
societal structures and society’s members.  
According to Lederach (1997), there are four elements in the reconciliation 
process: truth, mercy, justice, and peace.  Each element has a unique role in the 
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reconciliation process in order to really promote reconciliation on multiple levels. 
Psychologically, Bar-Tal (2000) writes, reconciliation “refers to a societal-cultural 
process that encompasses the majority of society members, who form new beliefs about 
the former adversary, about their own society, and about the relationship between the 
two groups” (p. 356) and is not necessarily a formal process encompassed within the 
conflict resolution process.  It is a psychological process because it involves changing 
“the well-entrenched conflicted ethos” which then “helps the society to cope with the 
adversary but at the same time fuels the conflict and constitutes the fundamental 
obstacle to its resolution” (p. 357).  Beliefs about societal goals, the adversary group, 
the ingroup, intergroup relations, and peace may need to be changed throughout the 
reconciliation process in order to replace the conflicted ethos to that of a peace ethos 
(Bar-Tal).  These beliefs inform the kinds of changes that need to, or that do, change 
throughout reconciliation.   
Peacebuilding is a process that involves both societal and political members of a 
community.  Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) stressed the need for 
peacebuilding work in Agenda for Peace, which spoke to the need for human rights 
laws and the need for developing capacity, along with peacekeeping work the UN did. 
This is the first time that the term ‘peacebuilding’ was fully introduced into UN work. 
Peacebuilding is a term that, in the context of Conflict Resolution, was introduced by 
Galtung (1976) in an essay where he defines the work of the UN as “dissociative” in 
comparison to “associative” where immediate issues of violence and issues of structural 
violence are handled directly. The associative approach deals with social relations 
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between parties in conflict as well as the “infrastructure of equity,” providing a way to 
resolve conflict without the use of violence (Galtung, 1976, p. 297).  
Oliver Wolleh (2001) conducted a case study, utilizing a grounded theory 
approach, on the development of the bicommunal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group in 
Cyprus between 1994 and 1997.  The Trainer Group developed through several stages 
in its attempt to gather a unified group of Greek and Turkish-speaking Cypriots to 
initiate dialogue and promote peacebuilding through bicommunal reconciliation 
activities. Participants consisted of thirteen Greek and Turkish Cypriots who were 
trained between 1994 and 1995. Benjamin J. Broome, a Fulbright Resident Scholar, 
facilitated the activities.  Obstacles for peacebuilding, developing a cohesive and 
unified vision statement, and developing project ideas were the first three phases of the 
workshops employed. Eventually, bicommunal workshops and facilitating groups were 
led in part by these participants, creating local, internal actors for the peacebuilding 
process within Cyprus.  Dialogues were initiated, and for the first time, participants 
listened to points of view across the cultural divide by engaging in ‘deep dialogue’ 
which “was characterized by the steps ‘listening – understanding – acknowledging’” 
(Wolleh, p. 18). There were many obstacles within the structure of the dialogue groups, 
but the evolution of the Trainer Group exemplified that “internal actors are able to 
establish themselves in the same way as effective, neutral facilitators and can take on a 
number of Third Party functions” (Wolleh, p. 45).  The major challenge, Wolleh 
concluded, was the presence of American trainers or facilitators in workshops.  He 
found that “the lack of trust is unconnected to the trainer’s personality or the method 
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applied, but rather with the worry of the participants that their expressions via the US 
network and the American negotiators become part of the official process of 
negotiation,” (p. 46).   Despite the existence of distrust, however, the development of 
bicommunal peace building activities paved the way for future reconciliation efforts; an 
important stepping-stone in this divided society. 
Many different factors found within conflicts influence civil society. The 
overarching mentality, emotionality, reactions, responses, and intention of organized 
mobilizations that spread across civil society differ according to circumstances. The 
nature of politics becomes a frame of reference for the conflict environment, warranting 
certain attitudes from civil society. Thus, the nature of politics incites different societal 
incentives to generate a movement across different sectors in society (Marchetti & 
Tocci, 2009, p. 201).   
Currently, literature about civil society and its actual impact on diplomacy in 
Cyprus does not exist. However, discussions of civil society roles have existed within 
philosophical dialogue for centuries (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009).  The literature 
examines how civil societies in both global and domestic contexts are independent 
agents for change. At the same time, civil societies are dependent upon the structures 
that exist. Civil society interacts with the state; they influence each other simultaneously 
(Marchetti & Tocci, 2009).  The multi-tracks of diplomacy can be seen working 
interactively as such, within their respective influences, especially in societies that have 
suffered a conflict and are trying to reconcile on several levels. It is as if it is impossible 
to reconcile on one level without reconciling on another.  Therefore, all diplomatic 
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tracks influence and can be influenced by each other. Because there is a lack of 
literature in relation to Cypriot civil society and diplomacy, it is hard to say whether or 
not they are in fact influenced by each other in Cyprus. 
The ethnic polarizations of Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus were and 
have been a result of Track I diplomacy efforts.  Track II work can be seen within 
Cypriot society since 1992 when bi-communal peace efforts were initiated through 
third-party non-state organizations under the auspices of the United Nations, United 
States, European Union, or other independent contributions (Katrivanou, 2009).   
The Buffer-Zone Incidents  
Scholars Benjamin Broome, Harry Anastasiou, Maria Hadjipavlou, and Bulent 
Kanol have been active in peacebuilding groups and have initiated bicommunal projects 
on the island since the 1980s. They combined their efforts to create a scholarly account 
of a contentious event on August 11, 1996 in Cyprus in an article “Opening 
Communication Pathways in Protracted Conflict: From Tragedy to Dialogue in 
Cyprus” (2012). A group of Greek-Cypriot motorcyclists in the Cyprus Motorcyclist 
Federation, organized an “anti-occupation” rally, protesting the presence of Turkish 
troops in the north (Broome, et al).  They planned to gather at the Dherinia crossing 
point, on the eastern edge of the buffer zone.  Many Greek-Cypriot political leaders 
openly endorsed this plan along with banks and cooperatives, which opened accounts to 
gather money in support of this cause. At the same time, “the UN warned that the 
possible entry of non-authorized persons into the buffer zone would constitute a 
violation of the cease-fire agreement” (p. 7) that could prove to have a dangerous 
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outcome. UN Secretary General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali intervened the day 
before the main event, which then led to an appeal from the president to the Cyprus 
Motorcyclist Federation to discontinue their plan. The organizers agreed to cancel the 
event and instead hold a rally in Nicosia. However, because there had been so much 
invested in preparations for the rally, some motorcyclists and others in vehicles arrived 
at the checkpoint as previously planned.  
Extremists in the north had prepared their own rally in anticipation of a 
confrontation at the buffer zone. Members of the Gray Wolves, a right-wing nationalist 
organization from Turkey was among this crowd. There were Turkish-Cypriot leaders 
asking Turkish-Cypriots not to participate, but their voices were muted by top-level 
Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish nationalist leaders, determined to “teach the Greek-
Cypriots a lesson” (Broome et al, 2012, p. 8).  Both sides of the buffer zone were lined 
with extreme nationalists ready to confront each other. Each group consisted of both 
civil and political leaders who were from an older generation along with mobilized 
youth of the island.  Many Greek-Cypriot demonstrators pushed through the buffer 
zone, throwing rocks at soldiers and police in the north. Demonstrators in the north also 
pushed through and fighting broke out. Both police forces and UN peacekeepers were 
overwhelmed. A Greek-Cypriot became entangled in the barbed wire of the buffer zone, 
and was beaten and killed. Videotape captured a Turkish-Cypriot officer participating in 
the beating and this videotape was immediately broadcasted island-wide (Broome et al, 
2012). Three days after the funeral of this victim, demonstrations occurred again at the 
Dherinia crossing.  This time, a Greek-Cypriot ran into the buffer zone, climbed the 
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flagpole flying a Turkish flag, and was shot by the Turkish military. This was caught on 
tape again and broadcast across the island. Nationalist rhetoric, hard-line views, and 
anti-Turkish sentiment filled the airwaves.  Greek-Cypriots pointed to the ‘barbaric’ 
nature of the Turks while Turkish-Cypriots reinforced their desire for a unitary state and 
argued that the presence of the Turkish military was necessary for protection. Neither 
side felt they would be able to live peacefully together. According to Broome, et al., 
these incidents can be seen as an example of protracted interethnic conflict with features 
of ethnocentric nationalism.  Conflicts such as this are incredibly complex due to their 
“negative dynamics that are self-perpetuating and extremely difficult to resolve” (p. 10).   
This incident incited further hate and nationalist sentiment, which created an 
opportunity to bring communities together and discuss the events. Seeing the bulk of 
their past peacebuilding work evaporating before them, Broome, et al,  made strides to 
create a bicommunal gathering in order to facilitate peaceful dialogue surrounding the 
buffer zone incidents, six weeks after they occurred on the International Day of Peace 
(Peace Day). Peace Day is a holiday in which those who have made efforts to promote 
peace are honored annually. These dialogues existed because Track I diplomacy was 
utilized and it legitimized the need for a peaceful gathering, thereby engaging Track II. 
In attendance were about 150 people, who included UN personnel, and ambassadors 
from most embassies on the island. In later events attendance was over 1000 with both 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots from Track I and Track II (Broome, et al).  
These bicommunal events resulted in a reclaiming of the belief that diplomacy 
could impact civil society efforts in peacebuilding, reducing some of the burden that the 
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incidents had created by using political influence behind the scenes to cut through 
hardliner tape in order to produce powerful peacebuilding events.  These bi-communal 
events continued through the end of 1997, challenging nationalistic mentalities. They 
“embodied the hope of a new post-nationalist paradigm that pointed to the replacement 
of nationalist animosity through interethnic friendship, and the expansion of people’s 
sense of community” (p. 29) by coming together across the dividing line following such 
hostile incidents.  Gaining support from diplomats in order to obtain permission to 
create a peace process around this incident allowed for a space in which civil society 
could become involved. This is one example of the influence the relationship between 
Track I diplomacy and civil society has on reconciliation in Cyprus.  
Ongoing Peacebuilding Work 
In the early 1990s, members of civil society in the peace process provided “a 
gradual awakening and mobilization” (Anastasiou, 2008, p. 35) that occurred despite an 
overwhelming environment of rapprochement at the diplomatic level.  Dr. Harry 
Anastasiou (2002, 2008, 2009) was active in this peace process at that time and 
mobilized Cypriot citizens despite diplomatic impasse and nationalist rhetoric. Citizen 
identity and social mobility in the past were redefined “in actions and attitudes that 
empowered the development of a public political culture” that created “active 
participation in the building and the forging of sustainable relationships of interethnic 
cooperation and power sharing” (Anastasiou, 2008, p. 41). This resulted in the creation 
of several bicommunal peace groups that focused on various areas of peacebuilding and 
reconciliation on a Track II level. These groups persevered despite ongoing attempts 
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from Cypriot nationalists and the Administrations to break up the meetings held in the 
buffer zone. Civil society mobilization in Cyprus from that point on “provided a viable 
model of how citizen-initiated peace building constitutes a vital dimension of civil 
society” (p. 40) and what that peace process could look like with perseverance.  
This movement challenged nationalists in both communities, but it also gave rise 
to new relationships with those on the grass roots level and with political leaders.   
According to Lederach (2002), the “peace constituency is a vital sociocultural resource 
and catalyst of conflict transformation” (as cited in Anastasiou, 2008, p. 42) and is 
necessary in the conflict resolution process, especially in divided societies.  The ways in 
which civil society urged political leaders to consider peacebuilding methods in 
diplomacy were carried under the radar and included informal talks where “conflict 
resolving ideas and options” (Anastasiou, 2008, p. 44) were shared that had been 
developed in think tanks with the support of international organizations. This strategy 
created a shift in attitudes and behaviors from the societal level to the diplomatic level, 
a positive change even if it only included a minority of the population.  
Nationalism 
The concept of nationalism is vast in its definition and research discipline. 
According to Paul Stern (1995), there are three classes of nationalism; a modified 
primordialist approach, an instrumentalist account, and a constructionist approach. The 
modified primordialist approach emphasizes an individual’s emotional binding to an 
ethnic group. The instrumentalist approach values nationality and ethnicity for the 
purpose of mobilization or organizing a collective based on common interests. The 
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constructionist approach stresses the social creation and nature of nationality and 
thereby of shared values. The constructionist approach also points out that “national 
consciousness” rises out of crisis and is then “brokered” by intellectuals who create 
identities and perceived interests, or even languages (Stern, p. 218). Stern also notes 
that these three perspectives lend insight to the explanation of national loyalty and 
nationalist sacrifice; there are deep emotional and normative components that are 
socially constructed, manipulated by leaders, and that overwhelm loyalty to any other 
social groups.  Nationalism is strongly rooted in self-interest and therefore, the interest 
of the nation, because that is where social construction and strong emotional ties exist.  
Nationalism, according to George Orwell (1945), is “the habit of identifying 
oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and 
recognizing no other duty than that or advancing its interests,” (p. 362).  According to 
Anderson (1995) and Hobsbawm (1994) a division is created between peoples and 
states and that division creates an “imagined community” (Anastasiou, 2002, p. 582). 
There, the community “is couched in an ethnocentric construct of history, highlighted 
by wars and revolutions,” which are then prolonged because of such separations, both 
physically and artificially (Anastasiou, 2002, p. 582).   
What follows draws heavily on literature from Vamit Volkan (1985), a Turkish 
Cyptriot scholar of nationalism. The nationalist is devoted to the state, engaged in a 
constant struggle to secure power for the state, and is unsympathetic to any suffering 
experienced by enemies.  Obsession with allegiance to the state, the narcissism of the 
group, and indifference to reality are other characteristics of nationalism. Volkan further 
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describes the nationalist as having “suitable targets of externalization” (p. 231) on 
which build a foundation in order to create enemies and allies alike. These targets of 
externalization are the result of continuous attempts to protect our sense of self and to 
regulate our selves. According to Volkan, we externalize that which we do not 
understand or like within ourselves. From a young age this externalization is in the form 
of a “transitional object” like a blanket or teddy bear, which is more important than 
anything else; even the mother. This object gives the child the illusion of an external 
reality that matches his or her capacity to create and helps the child in “developing a 
sense of reality and establishing his own individual identity” (p. 234).  The importance 
of nationalism in this psychological context is that in the nationalist’s mind, it is 
through the development of self-identification that “one assimilates the images of the 
other into one’s own self, becoming like the other in many ways” (p. 237).  
The ‘other’ is a term used to signify an enemy, a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ mentality, 
and a side other than your own. The other is the enemy; the one nationalists are fighting 
against in order to protect the nation. Volkan says that the enemy is actually the 
projected negative self, the externalized target.  Externalization may be in the form of 
familiar foods, languages, flags, etc., which add to an effect of conceptualizations like 
ethnicity and nationality. The ego identity can grow in a positive way with each value 
and any boost in self-esteem but, for example, an attack on the group it identifies with, 
will reduce it and make the group more cohesive as a result.   The danger is that group 
members “may turn to shared targets not only to patch up their disturbed sense of self 
but also to establish grounds upon which to reunite for mutual support and strength” 
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(1985, p. 241).  Volkan (1985) retells the story of the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus as a 
case of shared suitable targets of externalization in the form of parakeets.  When in 
1963 the Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves, they were surrounded by enemies 
and trying to survive a time of hardship. In order to boost their emotional survival, they 
raised thousands of parakeets in cages, caring for them in homes and shops.  These 
birds became the externalized public emblem of their “imprisoned selves” during that 
time. And, as Volkan writes, “as long as they could nurture the birds, they were able to 
regulate their individual senses of self, and to maintain the kind of hope that kept their 
group cohesive” (p. 242).  Once the Turkish Cypriots were moved out of enclaves, 
apparently the parakeet phenomenon ceased to exist, without mention or reason. 
As John Mack (1983) suggests, the group that one identifies with gives life 
meaning and frames values. If a person’s group experiences injustice, that group is 
threatened and there is a risk of feeling inferior to those deemed as the other, that have 
caused the initial threatened feeling. The other is considered to be an enemy and a cause 
that may eventually become something to fight against just as their group is a cause 
worth fighting for. According to Mack, nationalism is tied to three central domains of 
self-feeling: belonging, survival, and self worth. The need to belong is essential to all 
humans. The nation is essential to this sense of belonging, especially in symbols such as 
a passport or flag. Since the nation is supposed to protect its people, the function of a 
national or sub-national group is also to provide security to its people. National leaders 
tend to play on the fears surrounding security in order to mobilize those that would die 
for their nation, which then leaves little room for “sorting out realistic dangers from 
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worst case scenarios that are the outgrowth of primitive fears or profound ignorance of 
the actual intentions of other national groups” (Mack, p. 55).  Mack was able to see how 
self-esteem was closely associated with the fate of the nation, especially within the 
military. A sense of belonging, security for survival, and self worth within the national 
collective is important to the nationalist.  
Michael Ignatieff (2000) touches on the importance of the human need to belong 
within the nationalist mentality. If, he says, nationalism can appeal to a ‘just’ cause for 
war, it must appeal to people’s good nature as well.  Good nature is found within the 
family and home.  Killing must be for a strong enough cause that allows a person to 
justify risking destroying the family and home for the sake of also protecting family and 
home through such horrific actions. Ignatieff notes that nationalists are sentimental “and 
what is better than their love of home?” (p. 9).  Nationalist sentiment is important to 
explore within the context of the Cyprus conflict because so much violence existed in 
the name of the nation. It also informs present day negotiations and reconciliation 
efforts.  Nationalists still very much exist in Cyprus and it is to that group many 
Cypriots say political leaders are attentive because they make up a large part of their 
support base. 
In the case of the 1996 buffer-zone incident, two modern nationalist sentiments 
were combined with two older nationalist sentiments. After 1974, the Greek coup and 
the Turkish military occupation created nationalists that on the Greek-Cypriot side 
wanted the island reunited to its sovereign and territorial origin, or an ethnically 
partitioned island as on the Turkish-Cypriot side. Both sides focused on “their 
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respective mono-ethnic and exclusivist notions of statehood” (Broome et al, 2012, p. 
14), which remains a source of tension within current negotiations. The buffer-zone 
incident in 1996 roused that same sentiment while reinforcing the idea of the ‘other’ and 
their respective territory.  Both functioned under an ethnocentric nationalist perspective 
based on their mono-ethnic method of statehood.  According to Broome et al (2012), 
nationalists in the north acted on the “presumed ‘right’ of opposing any non-Turk from 
entering their space, even to the point of killing any Greek Cypriot who crossed the 
buffer zone” (p. 15) that stemmed from Turkish-Cypriot suffering in the 1960s 
combined with the conceptual image of Greek Cypriot enemies.  The motorcyclists saw 
themselves as “asserting their patriotism, loyalty to their ethnic community, and the 
right to restore the integrity of their presumed Hellenic island state” combined with the 
view that the action of the Turks affirmed “the terrible enemy image” (p. 15).  Both 
sides seemed to mirror their enemy images of each other in pursuit of their somewhat 
common agendas. This complex nature of nationalism not only structured the state of 
Cyprus as it is today, but has since perpetuated and informed conflicts that currently 
exist.  
Conclusion  
Having examined the literature on diplomacy and on civil society initiatives, it 
seems as though the most beneficial construct of reconciliation and peacebuilding on 
both levels requires a degree of collaboration when reaching a mutual goal. However, 
studies that examine the relationship between diplomacy and civil society are few and 
far between in Cyprus. Furthermore, the challenges experienced in Cyprus according to 
this literature are reflected in the form of nationalistic mentality, distrust of the other, 
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and little political structural change. The literature reviewed provides insight to how life 
actually is in Cyprus through broader terms and understandings of nationalism and 
peacebuilding. Nationalism is common in Cyprus and is rooted in enosis and taksim. 
Each community has a citizen base still focused on having closer ties to their mother 
countries, which ultimately drives policies on the Track I level and impacts the work of 
Track II. Nationalism is a characteristic that both Tracks have in common, at least in its 
overall impact in Cyprus. Practical applications of such definitions and/or theories have 
yet to be fully applied to the Cyprus problem today.   
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 The literature associated with Multi-track diplomacy and civil society 
engagement explores strengths and challenges related to trust building, development of 
bi-communal peacebuilding groups, and diplomatic involvement. There is limited 
research exploration of the influence and relationship between civil society and 
diplomacy in Cyprus and this issue has yet to be fully examined. Anastasiou (2008) 
addresses nationalism and its impact on the peace process in Cyprus as well as the ways 
in which civil society has attempted to engage with political leaders.  Wolleh (2001) 
examined the workings of the Conflict Resolution Trainers Group and their dialogue 
facilitations held in the buffer zone. Diamond and McDonald (1996) consider the 
different avenues diplomacy can take according to diplomatic tracks available. While 
the different tracks of diplomacy are separate from each other, tracks may intertwine 
with one another depending on the needs of a nation, state, citizen base, and many other 
variables. In order to understand the peacebuilding environment and elements of 
ongoing diplomatic negotiations in Cyprus, the following question is still unanswered: 
 How do Track I and Track II relate to each other in reconciliation and 
peacebuilding efforts during ongoing negotiations in Cyprus? 
 Qualitative methodology was used to explore this question. This methodology 
was used in order to find out what was going on in Cyprus on a social and diplomatic 
level instead of conducting an experiment to test a theory since really none exists. 
Literature data was the beginning step of this process. By accumulating research 
conducted by Cypriot Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), peer reviewed articles 
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on the Cyprus issue, information from UN Reports, and daily Cypriot news stories, a 
foundation of basic knowledge was gathered in order to build a broader understanding 
of information available and the themes and trends already identified. Immersing in the 
Cypriot culture first-hand by living and working in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, for 
six months, provided an observer’s insight into Cypriot culture. Finally, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with Cypriots across the divide in both CSO and 
Public/Political sectors. This provided valuable insights into the sentiments, processes 
and relationships surrounding the Cyprus problem between civil society and political 
leaders in the past 40 years.  
 According to Ambert, Adler and Detzner (1995), qualitative research is intended 
to obtain a deeper extent of intimate information about groups of people, learning why 
and how people behave and think they way they do, rather than what people actually do 
or what they may believe on a larger scale. Qualitative research also focuses on more 
structural and process-based issues. Furthermore, validity of conceptualization in 
qualitative analysis is developed by refining theories through reshaping conceptual 
images of observations according to ongoing observations. Research includes analysis 
of texts and field observations as well as theoretical perspectives, such as those found in 
interviews. The qualitative methodology found within this paper adheres to the same 
formula; textual data, field observations, and interviews.  
Strategies of Enquiry 
 Document Analysis. Texts to analyze were chosen based on their relevance of 
subject matter. If a peer reviewed article explored the Cyprus conflict to any extent, I 
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read it and took notes on my computer of new information, theories, or insights. I went 
online every week to read news stories from Cyprus to keep abreast of any new political 
movement regarding negotiations and to see whether bi-communal activities were 
mentioned. During 2009-2010 there were a lot of articles in the Cyprus Mail regarding 
negotiations but did not discover any articles relaying bi-communal activities. In order 
to gain an understanding of official UN work, I read Reports and Summaries easily 
accessed on the UN website.  I was able to find a few studies on Cypriot civil society 
while researching peer-reviewed articles, giving me a quantitative evaluation of 
political attitudes and categorizations. All of these texts combined laid the groundwork 
for further understanding the environment before living in Cyprus.   
 Observation. Observing Cypriot culture first hand was a fundamental part of 
the methodology for this research. While in Cyprus, I was immersed in the culture 
through my work placement, friends I made, and roommates I lived with. I was able to 
observe Cypriot culture in various capacities. I lived and worked in the south, but I 
crossed into the north daily to visit friends. The majority of my observations came from 
conversations at work, with friends, at cafes, events, and walking around in both 
communities talking to store owners. I wrote a lot of observations down in a notebook, 
but for the most part, I took mental notes on what I noticed. Every week I could hear car 
horns honking as strings of football (soccer) fans drove to and from games. Football has 
a huge place in Cyprus, and a lot of fans choose teams based on political backing.  In 
general, the football team APOEL is a highly politicized team with a nationalistic fan 
base while Omonia consists of more politically liberal fans. Being introduced to this 
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notion through a Cypriot friend was significant because it helped put the extent of 
politicization in the south of Cyprus into perspective. Cypriot culture in general tends to 
be very laid-back, especially in the summer due to the heat.  
I experienced with two different Greek-Cypriots, their first crossings into the 
north. This was a significant event and I noted how uncomfortable they looked and how 
out of place they said they felt. For both Greek Cypriots, it was almost as if they were 
betraying their families by going through the checkpoint and both said they would not 
tell their parents that they had crossed. This is a rather typical reaction for Greek 
Cypriots in this situation. The Turkish Cypriots I knew, however, crossed several times 
a week into the south for various reasons; shopping, work, or to meet friends. These 
observations helped form a broader base of understanding attitudes and daily life in 
Cyprus. 
Interviews. Interviews were conducted in Cyprus during the six months of my 
residency. Because Cyprus is a small island, it is easy to get to know the majority of 
Cypriots either directly or through people who know other people. Due to the small 
population, regardless of its ethnic and physical divide, I was able to network fairly 
easily and become connected to Cypriots who would be willing to be interviewed. 
Therefore, I used a combination of snowball and purposive sampling to recruit 
interviewees. Because I worked at a CSO, I was able to connect with other employees 
in different CSOs in both communities. I was connected with possible interviewees in 
the Public/Political sector through CSO employees who knew employees within the 
Public/Political sector across the divide. Through networking, I was able to interview 
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past leaders, current CSO employees, and current Public/Political Sector employees. 
Despite warnings that I might experience problems recruiting people due to a kind of 
research fatigue on the island, I did not encounter problems. Perhaps this was because I 
came to know everybody I interviewed. I chose interviewees based on the sector in 
which they worked and their willingness to be interviewed.  I sent out emails to connect 
with some people while others were connected through mutual friends. All of the 
interviewees had worked in their respective sectors for years and were passionate about 
their work.  
I interviewed 11 people working in the public/private sector (Track I) and in 
CSOs (Track II) before leaving Cyprus in August 2011. Each interviewee signed a 
consent form that stated his or her anonymity would be protected and all data would be 
locked away for the duration of this research and discarded a year after its completion. 
Some interviews were as short as eight minutes and as long as forty-five minutes. The 
interview questions can be found in Appendix A and B.  
Interviewees were promised anonymity, so this section uses pseudonyms in 
order to adhere to that agreement and protect each interviewee’s identity. Please note 
that quotes from interviews are written verbatim. There were four male Turkish 
Cypriots in the Track I sector, one male and one female Turkish Cypriot in the Track II 
sector, one female Greek Cypriot in the Track I sector, and three male Greek Cypriots 
and one female in the Track II sector. The following, Table 1, includes names divided 
into sectors and Cypriot community as a guide: 
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Sector/Community Turkish Cypriot Greek Cypriot 
Track I Musa 
Sedat 
Erkan 
Mehmet 
 
Nicolina 
Track II Nur 
Seref 
Philomena 
Alexandros 
Andreas 
Costas 
  Table 1: Interviewee Pseudonyms 
The Process of Analysis 
After each interview, I transcribed answers verbatim with the help of a recording 
device used during interviews. I applied thematic analysis throughout the entire process. 
Every interview was examined and analyzed individually. Finally, I compared 
interviews to each other with regard to answers to each question, identifying themes that 
may have illuminated my thesis question. It is the aim of the thematic analysis process 
to find repetition among interviewees’ answers that eventually speak as one voice or 
arise with a prominent theme (Creswell, 2009).   
Interview questions for each Track were the same with the exception of one, 
based upon the type of sector in which the interviewee.  Question number 7 asked the 
public/political sector interviewees, “What barriers do you think political leaders face 
when it comes to negotiating a settlement?”  Coding of interviews was completed in an 
anonymous manner, for the protection of the interviewees. For example, interview 
transcripts were identified by a code which included G for Greek-speaking and T for 
Turkish-speaking, which sector each interviewee worked in; “CSO” for Civil Society 
Organization or “PS” for Public/Political Sector, and the number of the interview. The 
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end result looked something like this: “GCSO1” or “TPS3,” etc. As research and 
thematic analysis continued themes emerged.  
I printed out each interview on different colored paper in order to distinguish 
them. I then organized them by questions, i.e., I excerpted each answer and placed it 
with answers to the same questions onto a huge easel pad. I was then able to discern 
patterns within the answers; themes which emerged, similarities and differences across 
communities and Tracks. Each page was marked by the end of this process with 
analysis notes, specifying interesting elements in this thematic analysis. Categories and 
themes had emerged at this point, all of which are described in detail within the 
Discussion of Findings chapter below.  
It is important to note that answers from each interviewee had their culture and 
gender taken into consideration during the process of analysis. This ethnographic 
approach helped bring more cultural perspective to each answer and to the themes that 
arose during this process.  As it turned out, gender did not seem to make a perceptible 
difference to answers.  
Comparing and contrasting multiple voices in corresponding sectors answering 
one question allowed themes to emerge. By grouping answers according to question, it 
was easier to see key words that were repeated from interview to interview. By coding 
each interview at least three ways, patterns across the divide, sectors, and sometimes 
gender and language, helped to differentiate one from another and suggest underlying 
relationships and common concerns.  
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CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
Interview questions, textual analysis, and observations provided data with which 
I could explore the overall question of this paper; how do Track I and Track II relate to 
each other in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts during ongoing negotiations in 
Cyprus? Interviews conducted were the most important aspect in illuminating findings 
to this question. However, the literature analysis and the observations contextualized 
and echoed the importance of themes which emerged in the interviews. Through the 
analysis of interviews, three major themes emerged. These themes speak to the barriers 
to cooperation between Track I and Track II Diplomacy, which are in the nature of both 
political and structural challenges. These themes are: Structural Elements, Nationalism, 
and International Influence. I have organized my findings within these themes 
according to answers from Track I and Track II sectors of interviews.  
Track I Themes 
Interviewees from both communities within the public/political sector indicated 
that the level of politicization in both communities hinders long-term peacebuilding 
work as well as obstructing a political solution. Interviewees from both sectors and 
communities spoke to the high level of politics that exist in the south that has affected 
civil society and diplomacy. Nationalistic mentalities are supported by such 
politicization, further hindering any cooperative peacebuilding efforts. Influences from 
mother countries, from countries with strategic interests in the island, and lack of 
international support for peacebuilding and reconciliation have created barriers to 
cooperation between tracks.  
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Structural Elements. The lack of cooperation between Track I and Track II is 
contingent upon the following factors: political barriers, monetary support, historical 
legacy, civil society involvement, and mutual support. The interview questions that 
evoked these themes were numbers 3 through 7.  A barrier to CSO work, according to 
Track I interviewees, is based on their lack of funding. Sedat said that while “most of 
the activities are supported by other organizations or governments” the support is not 
enough and the lack of volunteers within CSOs and high competition for grants make it 
so “it’s about funding.” Funding is low and therefore visibility is low, events are sparse, 
attendance is low, and organizations are understaffed. Sedat went on to mention that 
“unfortunately the businessmen are not that much into bicommunal activities in order to 
destroy the walls” because it would greatly increase civil society involvement as well as 
obtain funding through business-based endorsements. Along those same lines, civil 
society awareness can help gain societal involvement. Mehmet said that “to increase 
awareness of civil society in Cyprus, they have to become more effective and they must 
also come up with better projects supporting reconciliation activities and other events 
and activities which will help the two societies come together.” Furthermore, Sedat 
suggested that “social integration is a must for a political solution because it is much 
more acceptable to integrate the communities or people and let them live together and 
the efforts by Track I is not enough alone to maintain a sustainable solution,” which to 
several interviewees, is an important aspect of the reconciliation and settlement issue.  
It is important to note that the original, although abstract, question of this paper 
asked ‘which comes first, the chicken or the egg?’ This begs the question, who leads the 
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reconciliation efforts, political leaders or civil society? Sedat notes that it is important 
how leaders “behave, how they look, and what is their expectation because it directly 
effects the behavior of the community” because “the political leaders played a great role 
on peacebuilding. But this is a question a bit like the egg and the chicken, because you 
know the people are choosing the leaders.” He goes on to say that “that’s why it is also 
important what the people are thinking because they can play a constructive role and 
this is very important” for leaders to remember since “they are in front of the media and 
they have got the power to talk.” In short, the lack of mutual support between Track I 
and Track II hinders the peace process because each Track does in fact influence the 
other to some degree. Mutual support and even the issue of inclusiveness between the 
two sectors is important because, as Erkan said, “every time the government makes a 
decision, they do it with out consulting civil society and then in return you see people 
having protests and uttering very critical slogans,” which further hinders any 
cooperation between the two sectors.  While the relationship between both sectors is 
important, Musa brought up the importance of a good relationship between the two 
leaders and society’s role. He says, “the system is locked in such a way that without the 
consent of the leaders a solution will not be possible, even if civil society organizations 
concur on issues the solution will be fully dependent on the decision of the leaders. 
They have to help the leaders find a way to change their minds, change their policies. 
Their concentration should switch from, I mean, working for the betterment of the 
climate of two societies to the betterment of the relationships of the two leaders.” So 
while political leaders have the power and voice when it comes to negotiating a 
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settlement, Musa is saying that civil society could help with this effort by supporting a 
positive relationship between leaders. Nicolina reiterated this need for support, 
“politicians pay lip service to the need for dialogue with the other but do not follow 
through in practice and there is no demand from the society for a process of 
reconciliation to start.” On top of that, Nicolina says, “peacebuilding and reconciliation 
efforts have never been part of the agenda of the political elite on either side. The 
attitude has been, we need a solution first, reconciliation comes later. So there has been 
no support for civil society efforts even at times when negotiations for a solution are 
being carried on, as at the present time.” This seems to point to a complete gap between 
the two sectors, each one informing the other with their action, or lack of action. Based 
on interview answers, it seems as though there is a vicious cycle, where, because 
political leaders have never fully supported reconciliation through negotiations, civil 
society has not fully supported negotiation efforts due to the lack of reconciliation.  
Another barrier within this theme has to do with the failure of the Annan Plan. 
The Annan Plan had both political and societal reconciliation aspects. It was to be the 
final settlement option and reconcile the two communities once and for all. When the 
Greek Cypriots voted against it, it created more of a division and more animosity 
between the communities. Erkan suggested “the unification failed because you didn’t 
have many people being aware of the Annan Plan.” This is because usually civil society 
organizations “bring the bottom up approach and that’s why you can have more 
acceptance from the wider public…in Cyprus usually things take place from up to 
bottom so the leaders decide and the people have to either accept it or revolt against it,” 
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creating dissonance between the two sectors. Instead of having only animosities carried 
from the 1974 war, Erkan says now “we have the blame game.”  
Nationalism. Nationalism in Cyprus is and has been prevalent for years. 
Nationalists make up a large constituency base and therefore impact the speech, 
decisions, and behavior of leaders. Nationalism arose as a theme within two questions. 
When asked question 7, “What barriers do you think political leaders face when it 
comes to negotiating a settlement?” several interviewees across the divide suggested 
that political supporters and historic political roles have been formed by nationalists as 
barriers in both societies. Nationalists make up a large support base for political leaders. 
As Mehmet said, “they [political leaders] have populace barriers because in order to win 
the elections they have to make the nationalists happy and this is a huge barrier for 
government.” The influence of nationalists not only influences local politics, it also 
influences the way both leaders approach negotiations.  Erkan speaks to this issue as 
well, “at the moment our president has the support of the government but he is in 
conflict with his support base which is mainly the nationalists so he has to be very 
careful in proposing something” regarding negotiating a settlement. Sedat further 
supported this theme when he said that leaders, regarding nationalist supporters, “have 
to be careful about what the supporters are saying, that’s why there are too many 
dimensions on the issue. They have to be careful.” Musa saw a major barrier for 
political leaders being the “established entrenched formal official positions” that “they 
are enslaved by,” which are mostly founded within nationalistic mentality and historical 
rhetoric.  
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International Influence. This theme arose throughout questions 5 through 7. 
Support from the mother countries, Greece and Turkey, play a large part in political 
decisions and the extent of political independence each leader has when it comes to 
negotiating a settlement. According to the interviewees, the lack of political 
independence has a major role in the lack of negotiation abilities. For example, Erkan 
said that, “for our leader, he has to consult everything with Turkey, the policies have to 
match each other. He can’t be 100% independent. He has to take into consideration of 
Turkey’s role, Turkey’s relations with the EU, and Turkey’s relations with other 
countries. So he cannot either say I’m pulling out or I can everything in one day…he 
has to first negotiate with Turkey and then with Christofias. That’s the biggest barrier 
for our leader.” Because of political support and ties to surrounding countries, Sedat 
says, “the relationship between foreign countries is an issue” so leaders “have to be 
careful about finding a balance on the solution to the Cyprus problem” in order to 
maintain their international support. For Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Cyprus problem 
impacts Turkey’s accession into the EU to some extent, so there is a feeling of 
obligation to keep moving forward with negotiations. Because Greek Cypriots are 
already members of the EU, there is less of a pull to negotiate although President 
Christofias has been negotiating a settlement more than any other President in the past.  
To the same degree, however, both leaders are still not able to act as independent 
leaders due to ties to the mother countries. 
Findings indicate that Track I experiences structural challenges as well as 
influence from nationalists. Many decisions are reliant upon the influence and 
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permission from mother countries, especially in the north, where there is a direct link to 
Turkey politically and economically. The nationalistic constituent base and support 
from mother countries seem to directly influence structural elements of peacebuilding, 
reconciliation, and settlement negotiations.  
Track II Themes 
 Themes arising from Track II interviews were similar in that the themes of 
structure, nationalism, and international influence impacted peacebuilding and 
reconciliation work. However, due to the nature of CSOs in Cyprus, nationalism and 
international support or influence were felt less than the lack of structural elements. 
Findings demonstrated that the level to which Track II felt the impact of each theme 
was because of the lack of structural support. Credibility and support from Track I to 
Track II was lacking, the level of politicization in Cyprus influenced CSO work, 
historical mental barriers, funding, and societal awareness and involvement were all 
very relevant themes speaking to the lack of cooperation between Tracks. 
Structural Elements. Many barriers to peacebuilding efforts that exist within 
the CSO realm are similar to the challenges that Track I experiences. Credibility and 
support for CSOs is highly lacking, as Nur points out when asked question 5,  “What 
barriers do you think civil society faces in relation to peacebuilding and reconciliation 
efforts?” Her answer was that “the government isn’t giving any credibility to what civil 
society is doing so no support goes to civil society organizations and therefore, what 
civil society organizations are doing looks like a couple of hippie people getting 
together celebrating peace and love and nature.” More than that, the lack of structure 
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within CSOs themselves gives these peacebuilding events a bad name. Nur says that 
while the CSOs have a lot of good will, “they have never been structured enough, so it 
has always ended up just a couple of days of fun and never went anywhere,” however, 
she adds, “this is not only civil society’s fault, it’s not only about them. It’s not that they 
could not do it, there’s more to it” than having all responsibilities rest on the shoulders 
of the CSOs. It comes down to support, credibility, funding, and awareness.  
The lack of credibility and support for CSOs affects multiple aspects of 
peacebuilding efforts. Funding is a major problem and along with a lack of funding 
comes the structural issue of sustainability in peace work. Philomena said “one big 
barrier is lack of media attention by, especially in the Greek Cypriot community, by 
media, promoting positive work that’s taking place. Other problems is lack of funding 
opportunities and obviously the mental barriers that still exist very much to a great 
extent. We also have that with the parents of the children and that is something that it 
needs, is long term efforts and the majority of civil society work, because it’s based on 
short term projects, is not able to produce long term results for the future.” Sustainable 
peace work is something that would benefit civil society, allowing citizens to support 
their leaders in negotiations. Without “sufficient funding,” Costas says, “and the right 
people, then, many, many things can’t be done.” While there have been successful 
events given the extent of the resources “and the lack of political will to support them, 
they are definitely not the mainstreams,” Philomena says, “they haven’t taken off to the 
broader public and they have been based primarily out of Nicosia” which doesn’t allow 
Cypriots in other areas to get involved. She adds, “not that civil society work in Cyprus 
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overall has such a strong role.”  Findings have indicated that within Track II 
perspectives, the lack of Track II work, support, funding, and awareness have impacted 
the way peacebuilding and reconciliation have been structured. This has influenced 
contributions CSOs are able to make in society and in policies. Since the concept of 
civil society is fairly new to Cypriots, its role is not clear nor has it been able to become 
widespread.  
When asked question 7 “In what ways do you see CSOs contributing to policies, 
local politics and peacebuilding in Cyprus?” Costas reply was simply, “minimal.” This 
is due to the lack of credibility and support, leaving little power to CSOs to make a 
difference and, Costas goes on to say, “if they are effective it will be purely by accident, 
by coincidence. There is, there are many ways to change things but who is going to do 
that? So we are trapped.” Seref further supported this attitude when he said there is “a 
structural problem also environmental problem. People, they don’t have the civil society 
culture they have a state culture…I think this is an important problem and they don’t 
discuss this because they always say how are we going to improve the NGO but there’s 
a big cultural problem and no one talks about that.” Without a civil society culture, or 
movement, as Costas pointed out, no one is left to do the work from the bottom up.  
The relationship between Track I and II according to those in CSOs is little to 
none. Nur says that “there is no relationship between both, unfortunately. Even if it 
looks even if they’re trying to show there is, I don’t believe there is. They’re very far 
away from each other and they’re very extremely different.” Philomena pointed to the 
UNDP-ACT program and its efforts in cooperation and trust, having “tried to link the 
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civil society process to the Track I efforts but the Track I diplomacy is not very open to 
this type of involvement so far, at least it hasn’t shown that [it is].” The reason behind 
this, Philomena goes on to say is, perhaps “ because civil society in Cyprus is not 
viewed yet as something very solid and not personal interest driven, it’s hard for 
political leaders to open up a mode of communication with civil society whereas they 
do that regularly with political parties.” To Costas, however, the relationship is a bit 
different, although still lacking, because “the political parties in Cyprus have their own 
youth like segments of the party…they present themselves as if they’re part of civil 
society so they take over a role, which would otherwise be in the hands of people who 
are outside of political parties. A great many of the so-called peace initiatives have been 
organized by the youth of political parties. It’s as if they are extensions of parties 
themselves so this means that we a have gray area. It is not easy to talk about Track I 
and Track II if we have Track I and a half. And if Track I and a half belongs to Track 
I.” This demonstrates the level of politicization in Cyprus, which ultimately affects even 
the perception of what civil society is and does. According to Seref, “Track I has 
influence on Track II and III, because this is maybe everywhere, but here what 
politicians say really matters. For example, if there a positive rhetoric, that has a huge 
influence on what you can do and everything and it the Track I people allow civil 
society to engage in this thing, I think it might have an influence as well. Right now, 
they don’t do much…I don’t think the Cyprus problem can be solved with Track I, it is 
impossible.” Although there is a high level of politicization in Cyprus, “people are more 
open to and trust events by CSOs than to politicians actually, because especially in our 
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island, people have lost trust to politicians, they have lost their credibility, so it will be 
difficult for people to trust politicians again,” Alexandros said. This makes it difficult to 
become involved in politics and due to the lack of credibility and support for CSOs, 
makes it difficult to become involved in peacebuilding work. What Cypriots do, 
especially in the south, is to step away from both sectors and not involve themselves in 
either side.  This has created an apathetic environment where Cypriots go through their 
days as they would in any non-post-conflicted country.  
On the other side of the extreme, however, are Cypriots that get incredibly 
involved on a political level in a nationalistic way but steer clear of any CSO work 
being done. Part of this has to do with the historical aspect of the conflict. Another part 
has to do with, as Costas said, “that Cyprus is a very small island and a lot of people 
know when you do something. So a lot of people are reluctant to enter civil society 
groups and to be active in ways that would be high profile. Many people prefer to work 
as low profile as possible. This means that they are not as effective as they would like.” 
The reason this is important, Costas said, is because “people are branded.” Meaning, the 
consequence is political since “on the Greek Cypriot side the parties have a great deal of 
control” and “it reaches great levels of every day life. For example, if you are, if you 
become undesirable to one party, you might never get a job. Or you might never get 
promoted,” which is yet another example of the high level of politicization. Another 
barrier Costas sees in CSO work is that “there is a great deal of ignorance of the history 
of the island” about what really happened and why it may have happened. Basically, 
people do not have an understanding about what really happened and have stories from 
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their parents or from school about the conflict, both of which tend to be very one-sided. 
Education in Cyprus, according to Costas, “is specifically designed to prevent young 
people to think for themselves. They find little meaning in life, they have few 
aspirations. Their aims are directed towards money and wealth and so on…so this 
means they have very little interest and very little help in order to become involved in 
civil society.” Since there are other interests for those in power, political leaders, church 
leaders and those with financial interests in Cyprus, “are doing what they can to keep it 
in a very embryonic stage,” namely, not supporting or giving credibility to CSO work.  
 Nationalism. All questions asked rarely brought up the theme of nationalism for 
those working in Track II and did not appear as relevant as it did to the Track I 
interviewees. Most nationalistic issues were noted as being mental barriers from 
memories of trauma from the war instead of pointing to nationalists in general. This is 
exemplified by Alexandros when he mentioned that “a big barrier is the narrow-
mindedness of the old people…the past generation that actually lived the war” and it is 
that generation that is hard to reach out to on a reconciliation level. Costas, however, 
said that, whether it is from church leaders or grassroots leaders, “we had a lot of 
influence from those individuals who were nationalists and encouraged specific ways of 
thinking and specific ways of action for the pursuit of the union with Greece,” making it 
a challenge to move forward with reconciliation efforts.   
 The issue of nationalism, while applicable to Track I because of their support 
base, is rarely brought up as important within CSOs. Barriers within this theme have to 
do with the mentality of civil society, whether that actually comes down to the 
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nationalism that exists, generational influence, historical impact, or familial loyalty. 
Being loyal to the family is culturally significant and if parents or grandparents taught 
their young from a small age that the other side created his or her trauma, this produces 
demonization. This demonization could stem from a nationalistic mentality since union 
with Greece or Turkey was and still remains an important issue. 
 International Influence. Question 3 through 8 evoked some themes having to 
do with international support or influence within Track II. International influence, 
specifically, is something that Cypriots are aware of to some extent. The impact of what 
political leaders in other countries have in Cyprus has an affect on Cypriot political 
strategies when it comes to reconciliation and negotiations. Philomena exemplified this 
when she spoke of the role of political leaders and barriers they may face, “the blame 
game is not something that’s helping them in the negotiation process. Also non-
supportive statements by some countries is not helping them, like Egypt and Turkey.” 
According to Alexandros, international influence has a lot to do with the ongoing 
conflict in Cyprus; “the big countries, United States of America, Great Britain, have 
strategic interests in our island. I have read that they used to place people on our island 
to incite the conflict between the communities because keeping the people divided, it 
makes it more easier for others to come to the island and impose their views and 
actually introduce as a way of solution,” and it is “a result we can see. It’s not 
mythological or something, it’s something you can see that is happening right now.”  
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Overall Findings 
According to interviewees from both Tracks, structural elements, nationalism, 
and international support influence aspects of peacebuilding, reconciliation, and 
negotiations. While all Tracks have these themes in common, it is Track I that felt more 
influence from nationalism and international support than Track II. Track II felt more 
influence from structural elements than the other two themes. Findings suggest that 
because CSOs rely on structural support more than political constituency and on the 
support of other countries, politically, it would make sense that they feel more of an 
impact when it comes down to structural elements such as funding, credibility, and 
mutual support from Track I. Because Track I is so strong in Cyprus, it is 
understandable that their structural elements have less to do with negotiations and more 
to do with the relationship with Track II. It is also understandable that Track I would 
feel more of an impact when it comes to nationalistic influence and international 
support, since Track I makes up a lot of the structure in Cyprus while nationalists and 
other countries have more power over Track I decisions and actions. Overall, findings 
indicate that while there are degrees to the extent of influence according to Track I and 
II, the themes of structure, nationalism, and international sway impacts reconciliation 
and peacebuilding efforts as well as in negotiating a settlement for the Cyprus problem.  
In conclusion, when we look at Track II and Track I, it is the barriers that are 
their only relationship. These barriers, as summarized in Table 2 are; a lack of mutual 
support between the tracks, a lack of credibility and support from Track I for Track II, a 
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lack of funding, political barriers, failure of the Annan Plan, and historical mental 
barriers.  
Track I Track II 
A lack of mutual support between the 
Tracks 
Credibility and support from Track I is 
lacking 
CSOs lack funding Funding is lacking, meaning work is not 
sustainable and awareness is low. 
Peace efforts have never been a part of the 
agenda 
High politicization 
Failure of the Annan Plan Historical mental barriers 
Overall political barriers  
Table 2: Comparison of Structural Elements 
 
The second type of barrier is nationalism, as summarized in Table 3. This 
included; a strong nationalistic constituency, influence from nationalists on political 
agendas, nationalistic mentality which blocks outreach, the desire to stay low profile to 
due the small size of Cyprus, and nationalists’ strong ties to mother countries. 
Track I Track II 
Strong nationalistic constituency Nationalistic mentality blocks outreach in 
civil society 
Influence from nationalist on political 
agenda 
Small island, many prefer to stay low-
profile 
 Strong ties to mother countries, Turkey 
and Greece 
Table 3: Comparison of Nationalism 
 
The third barrier is international influence, as summarized in Table 4. This 
includes influence from mother countries, relationships with the EU, lack of political 
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independence, the blame game from other countries, and strategic interests in Cyprus 
from other countries.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of International Influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Track I Track II 
Political influence from mother counties, 
Turkey and Greece. 
Blame game from other countries such as 
Egypt and Turkey 
Relationships with the EU Strategic Interests in island from others 
Lack of Political Independence  
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CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
Central themes established here was that the relationship between Track II and 
Track I held an array of ongoing challenges. These challenges were similar in both 
sectors but the reasons for the challenges somewhat differed from each other as did the 
emphasis. The theory that arose most predominantely was that the relationship between 
Track I and Track II is kept very much separated by the country’s political atmosphere, 
which does not support awareness or education relating to reconciliation and 
peacebuilding with the majority citizen base.  
Implications 
The lack of funding, societal awareness, outreach, and high politicization that 
Track II experiences, is a result of a lack of structural support from Track I. The mental 
and historical barriers that citizens have towards reconciliation on the societal level are 
also the result of lacking structural support. The history of the conflict has been 
modified in schoolbooks on both sides of the divide, framed by nationalist rhetoric to 
tell one story. The historical framework provided in textbooks has made it so that 
support for reconciliation and peacebuilding is deterred from a young age. The majority 
of Cypriots has never crossed the buffer zone, has never been fully educated on the 
conflict, and lacks the desire to come together and reconcile. 
A possible reason that many say there is no relationship between Track I and 
Track II is because civil society is a new concept and the state and politics are indeed 
one and the same in Cyprus. When a new concept like civil society arises in a highly 
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politicized post-conflicted state, it makes sense that civil society would be seen as 
completely detached from the state itself.  A sense of empowerment on the societal 
level is deficient in Cyprus based on responses.  While there are many CSOs in Cyprus, 
the amount of nationalists and lack of political support seems to outweigh their efforts. 
The ways in which peacebuilding activities and events are structured also inform the 
environment of reconciliation. There were many ideas as to how peacebuilding 
capacities could be enhanced, but no reasons why each event or activity is not currently 
structured in such ways.  
A re-occurring question and something that was mentioned frequently, was the 
economic oppression in the north. I found that a few Turkish-speaking Cypriots were 
open and willing to work towards a solution on the societal level and wanted a 
resolution on the diplomatic level. Many bluntly stated that those in the north were 
more willing to work for peace than those in the south because of their problematic 
economic and international status. A few interviewees echoed my own observations in 
casual conversations when they mentioned that those in the south were comfortable 
with the status quo and that were anything to change, jobs would not be secure and the 
economy would change, making reconciliation in the south more of a challenge. I 
deduced that the lack of localized and focused peacebuilding work in the south was not 
solely because of high politicization, but because life in the south is much better 
economically, politically, and socially, than in the north. This meant that Greek 
Cypriots were not as motivated to make a change in their status quo. While both 
communities share common interests, retail tastes, and a similar way of life, the 
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economic status in the north is less than that in the south. A majority of Cypriots in the 
south live a comfortable life and receive benefits from being a member of the EU. This 
means that CSOs in the south have more access to grants, which means more money for 
funding, albeit short term. Although many CSOs choose to work together across the 
divide, money allocated is for very specific purposes. Since there never seem to be 
enough resources to go around, not a lot of money is obtained versus utilized. This 
means that any event is short term, low budget, and requires a lot of manpower. 
Because civil society involvement is so low, those that are involved work to put 
together these peacebuilding events while also working a full time job.  
Limitations 
 Limitations in the research had to do with participant willingness, language 
barriers, and culture. Mediterranean culture is fairly casual and unstructured in 
comparison to American pace of everyday life. While in Cyprus, I learned that when I 
make plans at 8pm, I know that the other party may not show up until half past or even 
an hour later, and this is acceptable. I also learned that in order to get something done 
when it relies on someone else, it is important to always touch base and keep on top of 
its status. It was also necessary to constantly be translating from my American English 
to British English as a second language, since that is the English Cypriots learn. 
Limitations regarding interview questions relied on the Cypriot way of communicating 
answers. Cypriots tend to view questions as guidelines for their answers rather than 
direct questions supposing direct answers. The number of participants in the study was 
determined the availability of willing persons as well as the number of times I was able 
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to touch base to set up concrete meeting times. Translating interviews verbatim was a 
challenge because of the language barrier.  My personal experience and observations in 
Cyprus were vital to this research and at times it was a challenge to remain neutral.  
Recommendations 
 Contributions from every interviewee embodied recommendations or ideas. This 
shows that while participation in peacebuilding activities may not be in abundance, 
many in each sector has an idea of how it should or could be improved. Between Track 
II and Track I, an important reoccurring statement about reconciliation and 
peacebuilding activities was to create a more sustainable and productive environment 
instead of short term “entertainment” or get-togethers.  Furthermore, a heightened 
support system from leaders could not only raise awareness about peacebuilding 
activities, but also elevate the sense of togetherness and community across the divide. 
Accordingly, Track II could make efforts to support and encourage a healthy 
relationship of both leaders as well as supporting settlement negotiations.  
Findings indicate that peacebuilding capacity in Cyprus is lacking. Views on what 
strategies should be adopted and pursued in order to increase peacebuilding efforts had 
to do with increasing awareness, relationships, cooperation, and involvement within 
civil society in both communities. Each interviewee from both Tracks had suggestions 
on how new strategies for peace could be adopted and on how the relationship between 
both Tracks could be structured in order to enhance peaceduilding capacities overall. 
Ideas on how to do this were, but not limited to, the following: 
- More sustainable events instead short-term events. 
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- Create more of a partnership with the media in order to be more visible and 
vocal in outreach. 
- Activities should be more productive than entertaining, helping societies come 
together. 
- Events should be more balanced in participating members, objectives, and 
locations. 
- Bring in international organizations to help create a strong model of CSOs and 
peacebuilding work. 
- Build libraries in every major town on the island. 
- Have people work side by side in business, not just events. 
- Gather rejectionists (re: Annan Plan) and nationalists from both sides and take 
them to a secluded area for a few days for reconciliation activities.  
- Organize events like cheese and wine parties in a neutral area without listing the 
guests or sponsorship.  
 
When asked for suggestions on how both Tracks should be structured in order to 
enhance peacebuilding, several different ideas emerged. For Track II, it was important 
that civil society be more informed about negotiations and become more involved and 
heard by leaders. For those in Track I, preparing the people for a settlement was 
important. The following list exemplifies if not specific ideas, overarching desires 
during the course of negotiations and reconciliation: 
- Create a civil society advisory council to the leaders. 
- Publicize when leaders have social time together to show that even during 
difficult negotiations, they can socialize and live together. 
- Institutionalize everything: labor organizations and business association 
involvement, on leaders’ schedules.  
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- Track II integrates communities socially by being a networking tool through 
peacebuilding efforts with Track I supporting this effort on all levels.  
- Leaders should make positive statements often in order to prepare civil society 
for a solution and reconciliation. 
- Work on changing history and other schoolbooks on both sides to be neutral. 
 
I recommend that further research that includes interviews on both sides across an 
array of disciplines be conducted on a larger scale than what I was able to accomplish in 
my short time in Cyprus. Gathering the opinions, perspectives, and suggestions from 
Cypriots on which peace-enhancing initiatives could prove to be helpful in the long run 
is important to creating sustainable relationships between the communities. I also 
suggest that, as one interviewee recommended, international organizations be invited to 
set up shop, so to speak, and help with funding, ideas for events, networking, and 
grabbing media attention. This would help to alleviate the embedded politicization that 
inevitably reaches CSOs and their efforts. If the UN or EU were to become more 
involved this would push the guarantors (Turkey, Greece, and the UK) to speak up and 
become more involved in the peace process as well. Since the Cyprus issue has become 
an international problem, it is time for the international community to pull their weight 
where necessary to expedite negotiations and put pressure on Cypriots to become more 
involved in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.  
 Research is important as a prelude to action and at the end of the day, action 
means more than research. There is a never-ending amount of research that can be done 
on the Cyprus conflict, its citizens, and political system. However, over the 40 years of 
this conflict, politics, nationalism, lack of funding and focus, and international support 
Diplomacy and Society in Cyprus                                                        64 
has hindered any major step forward. Negotiations between leaders have come to an 
impasse and have been fast-tracked. I think it is important to ask why, after over 40 
years of conflict, is this island still divided? While this paper may have touched on this 
question to some degree, there are many gaps to be filled. I observed many Cypriots 
focused on material aspirations as stray animals roamed the streets and buildings 
crumbled. I observed Cypriots in the north crossing to the south for employment or to 
shop as Turkish and Cypriot police became aggressive with protesters taking a stand 
against Turkey’s overwhelming political involvement.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is important for Cypriots to recognize how reconciliation by 
both sectors can and will have an effect on the course of negotiations. Before 
solidifying my question for this paper and research, I initially wanted to know which 
came first in Cyprus; the chicken or the egg? Do politics run the course of a resolution 
and reconciliation, or does civil society? I am now convinced that while it is up to the 
leaders to negotiate a diplomatic solution, it is civil society that ultimately accepts or 
rejects their new way of life once a resolution is reached.  
Anastasiou speculated that the following, as summarized in Table 5, provides a 
partial explanation of why there is a rupture between Track II and Track I in each 
community (Personal communication, June 12, 2012). Since Track I on the Greek-
Cypriot side promotes enosis (unification with Greece) due to its loyalty to its mother 
country, but Track II on the Greek-Cypriot side is content with its status quo of 
economic prosperity as a result of its EU enlargement, Track II actually has little 
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interest in supporting re-unification. In contrast, Track I on the Turkish-Cypriot side, 
also due to its loyalty to Turkey seeks taksim (partition of Cyprus). However, Track II 
on the Turkish-Cypriot side lives at a lower standard of living than the Greek-Cypriot 
side, they seek more economic exchange and therefore are more interested in equal 
status. The result is that the Greek-Cypriot Track II may be more compatible with the 
Turkish-Cypriot Track I and vice versa than either Track II is with its own Track I. This 
means that while this island is divided in many ways, it will continue to be so until 
CSOs and politicians can work to support each other. It is Track I that leads this process 
due to the level of politicization and it is Track II that could help support leaders in 
negotiations and reconciliation. 
 Track I Track II  
Greek-Cypriot Seeks unity with Greece, 
reconciliation  
Content with status quo 
Turkish-Cypriot Seeks partition of the island Seeks equal status, 
reconciliation  
Table 5: Comparison of Tracks Across the Divide 
If leaders began to vocalize the legitimacy and importance of reconciliation it 
would help CSO visibility, funding, and influence on the peace process. In turn, CSOs 
could call for a better relationship between both leaders and support them in their cause 
with their appropriate capacities, whether that is through events, media, or direct 
communication. Nationalism will always exist, but the extent of nationalistic influence 
on Track I in Cyprus could dissipate if Track I ceases to allow nationalists to have the 
same power as they do now. This way, Track I could create a space where negotiating a 
settlement is not only necessary, but beneficial overall, and communicate that through 
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civic engagement and ongoing productive negotiations. By supporting each other, Track 
I and Track II could begin a new relationship where, no matter what, peace is the goal. 
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Appendix	  A:	  Questions for those active in Civil Society Organizations (CSOs):	  
 
 
1. Tell me about the kind of work you do and about your work place?  
 
 
2. Have you ever been involved or have you worked in the political sector in the past? 
 
 
3. What is your assessment of the historical role of civil society peace initiatives across 
the ethnic divide?  
 
 
4. Track I diplomacy refers to work being done by governments, which is conducted by 
official representatives of state authorities. Track II diplomacy refers to work being 
done by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or Grassroots groups. What is your 
assessment of the relationship between Track I and Track II processes with regard to the 
efforts towards a resolution?  
 
 
5. What barriers do you think civil society is faced with in relation to peacebuilding and 
reconciliation efforts? 
 
 
6. What do you think the role of political leaders should be in relation to the current 
settlement negotiations? 
 
 
7. In what ways do you see CSOs contributing to policies, local politics, and 
peacebuilding in Cyprus? 
 
 
8. What is your view on what new strategies peace-enhancing agents of civil society 
need to adopt and pursue to increase their peacebuilding capacity?  
 
 
9. What suggestions do you have on how the relationship between Track I and Track II 
diplomacy needs to be structured in order to enhance the overall peace building capacity 
of the system?  
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Appendix	  B:	  Questions for those working within the political/public sector 
	  
 
1. Tell me about the kind of work you do and about your work place?  
 
 
2. Have you ever been involved or have you worked with Civil Society Organizations in 
the past? 
 
 
3. What is your assessment of the historical role of civil society peace initiatives across 
the ethnic divide?  
 
 
4. Track I diplomacy refers to work being done by governments, which is conducted by 
official representatives of state authorities. Track II diplomacy refers work being done 
by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or Grassroots groups. What is your assessment 
of the relationship between Track I and Track II processes in regard to the efforts 
towards a resolution?  
 
 
5. What barriers do you think civil society is faced with in relation to peacebuilding and 
reconciliation efforts? 
 
 
6. What do you think the role of political leaders should be in relation to the current 
settlement negotiations? 
 
 
7. What barriers do you think political leaders face when it comes to negotiating a 
settlement? 
 
 
8. What is your view on what new strategies peace-enhancing agents of civil society 
need to adopt and pursue to increase their peacebuilding capacity?  
 
 
9. What suggestions do you have on how the relationship between Track I and Track II 
diplomacy needs to be structured in order to enhance the overall peacebuilding capacity 
of the system?  
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Appendix	  C:	  HSRRC	  Application	  Proposal	  
	  
Portland State University 
HSRRC Application Proposal 
 
I.     Project Title and Prospectus 
 
Title of Proposed Study:  Working Title: The Relationship Between Track I 
Diplomacy and Civil Society in Cyprus: Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Efforts 
 
Prospectus:  In my study, I propose to explore the dynamics between civil society and 
Track I Diplomacy in Cyprus within the context of peacebuilding and reconciliation 
during ongoing settlement negotiations.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.  What is the nature of the relationship between Track I Diplomacy and civil society in 
the context of peacebuilding and reconciliation in Cyprus? 
 
METHODOLOGY 
I will be analyzing existing quantitative and qualitative raw data in alignment with 
thematic stages of grounded theory methodology. The theory that has emerged from 
multiple sources is that there is a lack of structural support in civil society, leading to a 
lack of direct impact on local and national politics. I will conduct a secondary analysis 
of data derived from multiple studies then pilot a semi-structured interview protocol to 
take to political leaders and leaders in Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). After 
compiling the data, themes, and interview answers, I will further analyze the 
collaborative results and present them within my thesis.  
 
SUMMARY 
Track I diplomacy refers to government diplomacy, which is conducted by official 
representatives of state authorities. Track II diplomacy refers to Civil Society 
Organizations or Grassroots groups. Cyprus is an ethnically divided island, having 
experienced war and trauma since the 1960s.  Effective peacebuilding and 
reconciliation efforts on both levels are important as political leaders continue 
settlement negotiations. 
 
A study conducted by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus Centre on 
the impact of peacebuilding work by agencies or groups in 2008 found that there were 
more factors contributing to the prevention of positive impact on the conflict than there 
were factors contributing to peacebuilding. The report concluded that peacebuilding is a 
multi-tracked effort that needs to be exerted on different levels of society in Cyprus 
along with incentives for both sides to mobilize, incentives that do not currently exist.  
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I will explore the impact and relationship of reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts of 
Track I and II diplomacy by extracting and analyzing data from reports and through 
interviews. I hope to identify themes between civil society and diplomatic activity, 
which may inform our understanding about the directions of influence.  
 
 
II.     Subject Recruitment 
Data will be extracted from Case Studies and Reports found through Civil Society 
Organizations, third party Organizations, and country reports. Namely, data will be 
pulled from Civil Society Organizations such as the Peace and Research Institute of 
Oslo, Cyprus, The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, CIVICUS Civil Society 
Index Project, The Olive Branch, and the Future Worlds Center. Reports from the 
Republic of Cyprus (South) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (North), will 
be obtained as well.  
 
After gathering information and pinpointing themes upon analyzing data, I will ask 
questions (See Appendix A) to individuals active in Civil Society Organizations and 
within the political sector. I will begin by making face-to-face contact with the 
appropriate people in each sector and tell them about my research. I will then ask if they 
would be willing to be interviewed on this subject. If they agree, I will set a time and 
date to interview them either face-to-face, through the phone, or via Skype.  I will ask 
them about their opinions and observations according to their position. I will be asking 
at least 5 people for interviews from Civil Society Organizations in the North and at 
least 5 in the South. I will ask at least 5 people working in the public sector in the North 
and at least 5 in the South for interviews. The age range differs, but those involved in 
both sectors on both sides are generally between the ages of 25-55. Ethnic backgrounds 
will be those of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.  
 
Depending upon those that are available and the local distribution of women and male 
employees, I hope to include an equal ratio of both ethnicities and an equal ratio of 
women and men. The interview will last no longer than 60 minutes and no less than 15 
minutes. The session will be recorded upon signed approval (See Informed Consent 
form in Appendices) of the participant and then transcribed for coding and review. 
Participants will be provided with results upon completion of the study.  
 
Screening 
In order to gather the most appropriate data to analyze, I will find political leaders to 
interview in the North and South of Cyprus. I will also find personnel active in CSOs in 
the North and South of Cyprus. Because I am interning with a Nongovernmental 
Organization in Cyprus, I will find these participants based on current connections. 
Participants from CSOs may include those working at Non-Governmental Organization 
or Non-profit Organizations, bi-communal agencies or groups, or individuals that have 
been active in the past with CSOs, agencies, or groups. I will find participants that work 
Diplomacy and Society in Cyprus                                                        75 
in the Ministries on both sides, United Nations personnel, and/or European Union 
personnel that are available to speak within their diplomatic capacities on this subject.  
 
 
 
III.    Informed Consent   
Please see Informed Consent form in the Appendices section for your review. As an 
investigator, I will provide each participant with a copy of the signed Informed Consent 
form and keep a signed copy of the Informed Consent form for my records, which will 
be filed in a confidential manner. This Informed Consent form will be given to the 
participant before being interviewed face-to-face, or will be provided through email 
prior to a phone/Skype interview.  
 
IV.     First-Person Scenario 
I received an email inviting me to be a participant in an interview on Civil Society 
involvement in the peace process in Cyprus. I replied to the email and noted a date and 
time I would be available to speak in person for no longer than an hour. I met with the 
investigator at a coffee shop, signed an Informed Consent form, and was asked if 
recording the interview was okay with me. I agreed and also retained a copy of the 
informed consent form for my records. I was asked a series of questions by the 
investigator. She gave me a copy of the questions that were typed on a piece of paper so 
I could refer to them during the interview. At the end of the interview, the investigator 
thanked me for my time and thoughts, and gave me her contact information along with 
contact information for Portland State University. Once the study was completed, the 
investigator emailed me written results and asked if I had any questions. The 
investigator thanked me again for my participation in the study. 
 
V.     Potential Risks and Safeguards  
Potential risks within the political and civil society sectors include recalling 
disappointments by their leaders or colleagues and having to limit their answers based 
on their diplomatic/professional capacity.   
 
Safeguards will be in place for all participants by allowing them to choose the most 
comfortable place to meet for a face-to-face interview, keeping to the approved 
questions provided during interviews, and ensuring anonymity. Anonymity will be 
assured through the use of pseudonyms and codes and by keeping all information in a 
password protected file on my personal computer and a locked file cabinet in the office 
of the Conflict Resolution Department at Portland State University.  
 
VI.    Potential Benefits 
Potential benefits include: Giving participants a voice by including their perspective in 
this study. This study will also benefit the participants in the long run as further data, 
understanding, and potential action develops on this subject. Information will add 
further clarifications to existing data. By pin-pointing themes between various reports, 
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as well as providing a theory on how civil society and diplomacy interact with each 
other to inform peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, will provide further 
understanding on how both levels may or may not impact each other, and why. 
 
VII.   Records and Distribution 
Participant confidentiality will be maintained through a strict use of assigned codes and 
pseudonyms in order to identify individual interviews. All materials related to the study 
such as recordings and notes, will be kept in a locked document file in the office of the 
Conflict Resolution Department and in a password protected file on the investigator’s 
personal computer. All data will be kept for 5 years following the completion of the 
study and will be discarded thereafter.  
 
B. Personal Notes and Observations, not to be provided to participant. 
 
1.  I will check off if the participant has experienced or observed any of the following: 
 
a. Activism, of any kind, on the Civil Society level. 
b. Involvement with policies or the political arena. 
c. Disappointment with leadership or civil society. 
d. Connection between diplomacy and civil society in Cyprus. 
e. Contributions from CSOs/politics to politics/CSOs.  
f.  Peace building and reconciliation initiatives in both civil society and political levels. 
g. Recommendations of restructuring peace building capacities. 
h. Assessments of track one and two diplomacy relationships in Cyprus. 
i. Views on obstacles or effectiveness of civil society initiatives in both societies. 
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